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Abstract. This paper presents an approach of role-based access control
(RBAC) for information systems with the use of MDA (Model Driven Ar-
chitecture). The main purpose is to join the concepts of MDA approach with
the concepts of access control models, in particular with the concepts of ac-
cess control based on roles and on usage concept. To reach this objectives
the appropriate solution was created to model the extended RBAC model and
URBAC model with the use of concepts and tools of software engineering,
in particular MDA methodology and UML (Unified Modeling Language).
The presented approach was developed for role engineering in the aspects
of logical security of information systems.
Keywords: access control, role-based access control, usage control, model-
ing of access control, model driven architecture.
1. Introduction
Recently, rapid development in different technologies of information systems
have caused the computerizing of many applications in various business areas.
Data has become very important and critical resource in many organizations and
therefore efficient access to data, sharing the data, extracting information from
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the data and making use of the information has become an important and urgent
necessity.
Access control is a significant part of each information system. It is concerned
with determining allowed activities of the system users and mediating every at-
tempt by a user to access a resource in the system. The evident objective of access
control is protecting the system resources from any undesired user access. Nowa-
days, the access control is connected with the great development of information
technologies and methodologies that allow to create more complex, dynamic in-
formation systems.
Data protection against improper disclosure or modification in the information
system is the important issue of each security policy realized in the institution.
Access control policies, strategies or models in some cases should be improved
or adapted to manage the security requirements of modern information systems,
such as dispersion of data and resources, dynamic changes both in data proprieties
and users’ proprieties, responsibilities and abilities from the point of view of ac-
cess control rules, dispersion of users, complex system organization with different
users, rules and security principles that are sometimes mutually exclusive. It is also
important to protect the information against non-controlled utilization and control
the usage and diffusion of the information. It gives the possibility to specify how
it can be used and specify the utilization constraints.
This paper presents an approach of role-based access control (RBAC) for in-
formation systems with the use of MDA (Model Driven Architecture). The main
purpose is to join the concepts of MDA approach with the concepts of access con-
trol models, in particular with the concepts of access control based on roles and
on usage concept. To reach this objectives the appropriate solution was created to
model the extended RBAC model and URBAC model with the use of concepts and
tools of software engineering, in particular MDA methodology and UML (Unified
Modeling Language). The presented approach was developed for role engineering
in the aspects of logical security of information systems.
The method developed in the paper was supported by the object-oriented de-
sign described in the UML (Unified Modeling Language). Owing to its high level
diagrams, the UML [1, 2] allows to specify clearly the information system needs
and facilitates the dialog between different actors (i.e. system user, application/sys-
tem developer, security administrator) that interact in its design.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the access control poli-
cies, models and related works on access control concepts, section 3 deals with
Model Driven Architecture and software engineering techniques for access con-
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trol. Section 4 describes the MDA approach for modeling of access control in
information system based on role concept and on usage concept.
2. Access control policies and models
Data protection against improper disclosure or modification is an important
requirement of each information system. Access control allow to define the user’s
responsibilities and possibilities in a system. It can define what a user can do di-
rectly and also what programs executing on behalf of the user are allowed to do.
Access control limits the activities of successfully authenticated users basing on
the security constraints defined on the conception level and on the administration
level.
The system administrators have to implement the access control mechanisms
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of applications and its data. In the past,
the user access was granted by adding necessary permissions to each individual
application, which made the administration, involving many users and several dif-
ferent applications, complicated and ineffective.
The development of access control policies and models has a long history. It is
difficult to mention all the access control models that were specified in literature
and this is not the objective of this paper. It is possibly to distinguish two main ap-
proaches. The first one represents the group of traditional access control models.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model [3, 4], the first model in these group,
manages the users’ access to information based on user identification and on the
rules defined for each user (i.e. subject) and each object in the system using the
access control matrix. However, the DAC model has the inherit weakness that in-
formation can be copied from one object to another and it is difficult for DAC to
enforce the safety policy and protect the data against some security attacks.
In order to prevent the shortcomings of DAC model, the Mandatory Access
Control (MAC) model was created to enforce the lattice-based policies [3]. In this
model each subject has their own authorization level that permits them the access
to objects starting from the classification level, which has lower or equal range.
MAC does not consider the covert channels but they are expensive to eliminate.
Next, Sandhu et al. proposed the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model [4, 5]
that has been considered as an alternative to DAC and MAC models. This model
requires the identification of roles in a system. The RBAC model was a progress in
access control but it is still centered around the access control matrix and has static
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character, particularly from the point of view of distributed information systems
[5].
The second approach of access control models corresponds to the temporal
models that introduce the temporal features into traditional access control. The
temporal authorization model was proposed by Bertino and al. in [6] that is based
on the temporal intervals of validity for authorization and temporal dependencies
among authorizations. Next, the Temporal-RBAC (TRBAC) model was proposed
in [7]. This model introduces the temporal dependencies among roles. Other model
- Temporal Data Authorization model (TDAM) was presented in [8] and extends
the basic authorization model by temporal attributes associated to the data such as
transition time or valid time. Recently, the TRBAC model was extended to Gen-
eralized Temporal RBAC (GTRBAC) model in [9] to express the wider range of
temporal constraints.
Unfortunately, all these models propose still the static authorization of access
control decisions that are based on the subject’s permits and possibilities which
can be performed on the target objects. If the access to the object is permitted,
the subject can access it repeatedly at the valid time intervals, i.e. during the log-
ging session. However, the appearance of new trends in global markets, trades and
economy joined with the Internet development (i.e. e-business, e-markets, supply
chain management) caused changes in information technologies, also concerning
the development of information systems and security of these systems. In conse-
quence, it provoked the necessity of new access protocols and solutions for flow
of objects, informations stored in information systems, that are more complex and
more distributed.
Park and Sandhu defined Usage Control (UCON) model [10, 11] as an ac-
cess control generalization used for security policy evaluation before the access
(as usual) and during the access to information because security policy can dy-
namically vary. The UCON considers the the temporal attributes as the mutable
attributes of subjects or objects and permits to evaluate the usage decision also
during the access to the information to which we want to control the usage. It is
realized based on set of authorizations, obligations and conditions to satisfy.
However, the RBAC model seems to be still the most popular and most stable
and for these reasons it was chosen at the beginning of our study. The definition of
roles in the RBAC model implies the determination of organizational roles of each
person in a given organization. It gives the possibility to present the organization
structure from the point of view of access control. This model provides the support
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Figure 1. Extended RBAC model
for several important security principles (i.e. least privilege, privilege abstraction
and separation of duties) but does not dictate how they should be put into practice.
The same can be obtained with the UCON model. It gives the possibility to manage
the dynamism of information systems security but the model it abstract and does
not specify how to use them in practice. How to define the role engineering for
information systems?
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [12, 13] requires the identification of roles
in a system. The role is properly viewed as a semantic structure around which the
access control policy is formulated.
In extended RBAC (eRBAC) model [14, 15] each role realizes a specific task
in the enterprise process and it contains many functions that the user can take. For
each role it is possible to choose the necessary system functions. Thus, a role can be
presented as a set of functions that this role can take and realize. Each function can
have one or more permissions, and a function can be defined as a set or sequence
of permissions. Specific access rights are necessary to realize a role or a particular
function of this role. Therefore, in extended RBAC model some elements were
specified in comparison to classical RBAC model, i.e. function, object, method,
class, operation, to express more complex the elements of information system that
are secured by this model (Fig. 1).
Usage Role-based Access Control (URBAC) [16] is based on a role concept
from extended Role-Based Access Control and usage concept from Usage Control.
It takes best features from both models in order to combine them into an even
more efficient model of an access control. It incorporates the control of usage in
data access with authorizations, obligations and conditions that can be applied
both before and during access. URBAC also uses a complete and precise way to
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Figure 2. Meta-model of URBAC approach
represent the entire system organization with the use of roles and functions. The
main elements of the model are presented in figure 2.
3. Model Driven Architecture and software engineering
techniques for access control
MDA (Model Driven Architecture) is an approach that separates the specifica-
tion of system operations from the implementation details of system functionality
on the given platform. The business model in MDA is leaved aside as Platform In-
dependent Model (PIM) and a system for concrete platform is defined as Platform
Specific Model (PSM) that is created from PIM by application of translation rules
specific for given platform [17].
In MDA everything is treated as a model of model element. In consequence,
well defined model language, for example Unified Modelling language (UML),
plays an important role because it is used to describe precisely this model. MDA
gives the possibility to define the languages for concrete domains that can precisely
formalize the specific areas such as business domains, system aspects or special
technologies. Then, the users can describe PIM and PSM basing on defined meta-
models, specific fo given domain.
MDA was to proposed as an approach determining the creation method of ap-
plications where systems are presented as models and as an approach for automatic
generation of systems basing on these models. Of course, complete automatic syn-
thesis of complex system from high-level description is unattainable in general. It
is not possible to generate automatically the functions implementing system func-
tionality, i.e. business logic, but we can automatize the generation of different no-
functional system elements, specified for given platform, such as login or system
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aspects. Security and in particular access control are one of such aspects that can
be generated automatically.
Model driven security means the reduction of gap between system models and
security models and reduction of gap between system project and its implementa-
tion. The security, in particular the access control has to be openly integrated with
modeling language and supported on transformation stage.
At the beginning the developer designs the RBAC XACML (respectively UR-
BAC XACML) specification of PIM models basing on access control points to-
gether with application models. Next, created RBAC XACML (URBAC XACML)
PIM model is transformed to RBAC/URBAC XACML specification characteristic
for the platform that is used for generation of infrastructure of security files. Af-
ter automatic generation of security infrastructure, the developers implement the
missing parts basing on generated framework, create the system and test it.
Currently, Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a standard language for anal-
ysis and design of information systems. It is widely known and used in software
engineering field to support the object oriented approach. Specification of the lan-
guage differs between abstract syntax and notation. Abstract syntax defines the
language of primitives used to build the models and the notation defines the graph-
ical representation of these primitives. UML supports the description of system
structure and behavior, gives the possibility to present the system using different
models or points of view. It has a set of diagrams to represent the elements of
whole information systems or one of its components. Some chosen features of
UML can be used to implement the eRBAC model, especially during the design
of information system and its associated security schema based on eRBAC model
[1, 2].
UML describes the processes that occur in a system or application and such
processes are use case oriented. Use case is the main concept of UML used in
analysis and design of software. It is used for specifying required usages of a sys-
tem, to capture the requirements of a system, describes what a system is supposed
to do.
Two types of UML diagrams have been chosen to provide the RBAC/URBAC
model: use case diagram and interaction diagram. The use case diagram presents
the system’s functions from the user point of view. It define the system’s behavior
without functioning details. According to UML meta-model, each use case from
use case diagram should be described by a scenario and in consequence by at least
one interaction diagram (i.e. sequence diagram or communication diagram). The
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interaction diagram describes the behavior of one use case [1, 2]. It represents the
objects and messages exchanged during the use case processing.
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) defines declarative
language of access control realized in XML and model for evaluation processing
of access requests according to rules specified in XACML. It is a security standard
created to use the security rules and also to configure, develop and modify these
rules with minimal costs [18].
XACML is first of all the access control system based on attributes (Attribute
Based Access Control, ABAC), where attributes are joined with an user, an activ-
ity or resource and the making decision about granting the user access is based
on these attributes. The role-based access control and its extensions can be also
realized with the use of XACML.
The XACML allows to separate the decision of access permission from the
concrete use case. When the decisions of access permission (i.e. authorizations)
are placed in client applications it is very difficult to actualize the decision criteria
especially when the changes in their granting occur. When the client (i.e. user) is
separated from the access decision then authorization principles can be actualized
on a current basis and they will concern all clients at once [18].
XACML based system contains four following elements:
• PAP - Policy Administration Point - management point of access control
policy. Any modifications of access control policy and security rules are
realized in this place.
• PEP - Policy Enforcement Point - this component verifies the access requests
in respect of validity, user identity and return the access to required data or
access refusal
• PIP - Policy Information Point - information point about access policy. It
collects the information for decision point that will be used for decision
making and has to ensure all the necessary information. PIP is usually the
"front-end" component for many other systems tah can be used for security
policy decision.
• PDP - Policy Decision Point - this point makes the decision for access re-
quest with the use of rule engine or another mechanism.
Access control policy in XACML standard is divided into three levels of ele-
ments (Fig. 3):
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Figure 3. PolicySet, Policy and their joined components in XACML
• PolicySet - set of security policies (Fig. 4),
• Policy - set of access control rules (Fig. 5) and
• Rule (Fig. 6).
Subject is a system entity that requires an access. It can have one or more at-
tributes. Resource element is a service of system component. Resources has only
one attribute. Action element defines the access mode that is required for certain re-
source. Action has one or more attributes. Environment element can contain even-
tually additional information. Example of access control policy defined in XACML
can be as follows:
<Policy PolicyId=" " RuleCombiningAlgId=" ">
<Target>
<Subjects> ...</Subjects>
<Resources> ...</Resources>
<Actions> ...</Actions>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId=" " Effect=" ">
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Figure 4. PolicySet class implemented in .NET technology [19]
<Target> ...</Target>
<Condition FunctionId=" "> ...</Condition>
</Rule>
<Obligations>
<Obligation ObligationId=" " FulFillOn=" "> </Obligation>
</Obligation>
</Policy>
4. MDA for modeling of role based access control approach
The problem in MDA approach for modeling of role based access control and
usage control is the expression transparency of access control method connected
with minimal knowledge that should have the person who will model the rules
of dynamic access control to resources. In such case, a resources can be consider
in abstract way in order to find the universal method, independent on the secured
resources.
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Figure 5. Policy class implemented in .NET technology [19]
The proposed solution of this problem is to join the intuitive approach of UML
with XACML that allows to define the security policy. UML is a standard tool of
object-oriented analysis and design of information systems that is known every-
where. From the other side, XACML ensures ready principles for resources secu-
rity and uses XML that is standard language for record and exchange of data files.
Moreover, there are exist programming libraries of XACML security standard for
two the most popular programming platforms, i.e. .NET and Java (XACML.NET
for C# language and Sun XACML for Java language).
Proposed solution allows to create a system basing on two independent ap-
plications. First application enables modeling of access policy in transparent way
with the use of UML notation, in particular graphical notation of class/object di-
agrams. It is used to serve only the files created in XACML standard based on
XML. For that reason it allows the creation of appropriate hierarchy of different
objects, such as PolicySet, Policy, Rule, Subject, Target. Next, it allows to export
the created object diagram to XML file or to load such file to the program (for ex-
ample to show the graphical representation of set of policies and rules). Therefore,
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Figure 6. Rule class implemented in .NET technology [19]
the first part of a system is used to determine concrete permissions according to
RBAC (eRBAC or URBAC) with the use of UML.
The second part of a system (i.e. second application) is responsible for login
into system using API XACML, named Sun XACML. It grants users the access
basing on the events and knowledge about the user that wants to access the re-
sources. Event that can be used for such operations is for example timing event.
This system’s part has to verify if all policies modeled in the first part function in
desirable way.
The solution used to join the modeling language independent on the platform,
i.e. UML, with a standard for description of security rules functions through the
possibility of creation and deletion of objects from certain hierarchy. Single object,
represented by abstract class SingleXACMLObject allows to nest in it other inferior
objects came from the same abstract class. Number of children of parent object is
unlimited.
Application to model the access rules
The application was created to guarantee the functioning of set of rules. There-
fore, the correct functioning can be based on single object of type Policy as a hi-
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erarchy root. This object can contain other objects of XACML standard, it can
contain directly such objects as Target, Description or many objects of Rule type.
Role based access control policy based on eRBAC model defined in XACML
standard is following:
<Policy PolicyId=" " RuleCombiningAlgId=" ">
<Target>
<User> ...</User>
<Role> ...</Role>
<Function> ...</Function>
<Permission> ...</Permission>
<Object> ...</Object>
<Method> ...</Method>
<Class> ...</Class>
<Operation> ...</Operation>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId=" " Effect=" ">
<Target> ...</Target>
<Condition PermissionId=" "> ...</Condition>
</Rule>
<Constraint>
<Constraint ConstraintId=" " FulFillOn=" "> </Constraint>
</Constraint>
</Policy>
Access control policy based on URBAC approach defined in XACML standard
is as follows:
<Policy PolicyId=" " RuleCombiningAlgId=" ">
<Target>
<Subject> ...</Subject>
<User> ...</User>
<GroupUsers> ...</GroupUsers>
<Role> ...</Role>
<Function> ...</Function>
<Permission> ...</Permission>
<Object> ...</Object>
<Method> ...</Method>
<Class> ...</Class>
<Operation> ...</Operation>
</Target>
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<Rule RuleId=" " Effect=" ">
<Target> ...</Target>
<Condition UserId=" "> ...</Condition>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId=" " Effect=" ">
<Target> ...</Target>
<Condition GroupUsersId=" "> ...</Condition>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId=" " Effect=" ">
<Target> ...</Target>
<Condition PermissionId=" "> ...</Condition>
</Rule>
<Constraint>
<Constraint ConstraintId=" " FulFillOn=" "> </Constraint>
</Constraint>
<Authorization>
<Authorization AuthorizationId=" " FulFillOn=" "> </Authorization>
</Authorization>
<Obligation>
<Obligation ObligationId=" " FulFillOn=" "> </Obligation>
</Obligation>
<Condition>
<Condition ConditionId=" " FulFillOn=" "> </Condition>
</Condition>
</Policy>
Simple example of application functioning can be as follows. Single Policy
contains one inferior element Target and two inferior rules Rule: first rule permits
an access to a resources with some conditions and final rule that denies an access
in other cases. File is recorded in XML standard and transfered to the second part
of the system, responsible for an access to resources. Code generated in XACML
for such example is as follows:
<Policy PolicyId="ExamplePolicy"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining
-algorithm:permit-overrides">
<Rule RuleId="PermitRule" Effect="Permit"/>
<Target/>
<Rule RuleId="DenyRule" Effect="Deny"/>
</Policy>
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5. Conclusion
Proposed conception and implemented solution can be used for real problems
connected with access control to system resources. It is realized basing not only
on users properties but also on additional context of access realization. The role
based access control (in particular extended role based access control model) and
usage control can be modeled with the use of MDA approach that contains UML,
XML and XACML technologies. Moreover, the presented solution is independent
on the platform and the only condition is installed Java Virtual Machine.
Important issue is the form and place for storage of generated set of access
rules for different system users. These data are very important for proper function-
ality of a system from security point of view and they have to be accessible for
system designers and security administrators.
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